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Abstract
This paper shows that incomplete information can lead to self-ful￿lling business cycles. This
is demonstrated in a standard dynamic general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition
￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz. In the absence of fundamental shocks, the model has a unique certainty (fun-
damental) equilibrium. But there are also multiple stochastic (sunspots) equilibria that are not
mere randomizations over fundamental equilibria. Thus, sunspots can exist in in￿nite-horizon
models with a unique saddle-path steady state. In contrast to the indeterminacy literature
following Benhabib and Farmer (1994), sunspots are robust to parameters associated with pro-
duction technologies and preferences.
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11 Introduction
Keynes (1936) emphasized the process of expectation formation and argued that expectations
may become self-ful￿lling when reinforced via iterated speculation under incomplete informa-
tion. A number of papers, starting with Benhabib and Farmer (1994), have revived the study of
expectations-driven ￿ uctuations within the general equilibrium framework of Kydland and Prescott
(1982).1 This literature can be cast in the framework of monopolistic competition ￿ la Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977).2 A key feature of this literature is that the steady state in the model is locally inde-
terminate so that there exit in￿nitely many equilibrium paths converging to the same steady state.
This multiplicity of equilibria can give rise to ￿ uctuations driven by self-ful￿lling expectations (or
sunspots).3
However, sunspot equilibrium based on local indeterminacy is extremely sensitive to structural
parameters and, consequently, lack robustness. Local indeterminacy would not be possible in this
class of models, for example, if there are small adjustment costs in capital or labor (see Georges
1995, and Wen 1998b). Slight change of parameter values (such as the elasticity of labor supply,
rate of capital depreciation, capital￿ s share in total income, degree of returns to scale, and so on)
can easily eliminate indeterminacy and insulate the model economy from ￿ uctuations driven by self-
ful￿lling expectations. In addition, since such models imply indeterminacy in the impulse responses
to fundamental shocks, it is di¢ cult to confront data based on VAR analysis without additional
assumptions about the set of the indeterminate variables and their initial values.
This paper focuses on a di⁄erent source of sunspot equilibria within the class of imperfectly
competitive DSGE models ￿ la Dixit and Stiglitz. This source does not rely on local indeterminacy
or the topological properties of the steady state (i.e., the eigenvalues). Instead, it is related to
expectation formation under incomplete information. In this regard, sunspot equilibria under our
consideration are less sensitive to structural parameters pertaining to production technologies and
preferences.
Incomplete or imperfect information as a mechanism of generating expectations-driven business
cycles has been emphasized by Townsend (1983) and Sargent (1991). This tradition has recently
been revived by a number of people, including Kasa (2000), Woodford (2003), Adam (2007), and
Lorenzoni (2008), among others. The recent studies of "news" as a source of the business cycle
is also related to this literature (see, e.g., Beaudry and Portier, 2004 and 2007; Jaimovich and
1Also see Woodford (1986, 1991), among others. For a literature review, see Benhabib and Farmer (1999). For
early contributions to the sunspot literature, see Shell (1977), Azariadis (1981), and Cass and Shell (1983).
2See Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Schmitt-GrohØ (1997).
3Important recent works following this literature include Benhabib and Farmer (1996), Benhabib and Wen (2004),
Christiano and Harrison (1999), Farmer (1999), Farmer and Guo (1994), Gali (1994), Jaimovich (2007, 2008), Pintus
(2006, 2007), Weder (1998), and Wen (1998a), among many others.
2Rebelo, 2007a and 2007b; and Wang, 2007).4 This literature, however, does not consider incomplete
information as a mechanism of generating self-ful￿lling sunspot equilibria. In contrast, we show
that incomplete information is itself a natural mechanism of endogenous business cycles in a Dixit-
Stiglitz world.
The nature of sunspot equilibria arising under incomplete information di⁄ers from that arising
under local indeterminacy in three important aspects: 1) sunspots are independent of the eigen-
values of a model; 2) sunspot equilibria are not based on mere randomizations over fundamental
equilibria; and 3) sunspots can be serially correlated. Because of property (1), sunspots are more
pervasive and easier to occur in a standard economic environment. Because of property (2), sunspots
equilibria can exist even in models with a unique saddle-path fundamental equilibrium. Because of
property (3), models driven by sunspot shocks have better potential to explain the business cycle
than realized in the literature.5 These properties are in contrast to the recent sunspot literature
following Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and constitute an extension of the original insight of Cass
and Shell (1983).6
DSGE models featuring imperfect competition ￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz have been widely used and
extensively studied in the literature, but the possibility of sunspot equilibria in this class of mod-
els has gone virtually unnoticed because the literature implicitly assumes perfect information ￿
that each ￿rm can perfectly anticipate (or infer) the equilibrium level of aggregate demand when
setting its own prices. This assumption of perfect information rules out sunspot-Nash equilibria.
However, because ￿rms must each choose a price simultaneously (taking as given the anticipated
level of aggregate demand and prices set by other ￿rms) and equilibrium quantities of demand are
subsequently determined at these prices, it is only natural to assume that prices are set based on
expected demand, not on realized demand. In such a case, expectations can be self-ful￿lling when
there exist strategic complementarities among ￿rms actions.7
Strategic complementarities as a source of multiple equilibria are emphasized by Cooper and
John (1988) and arise naturally in models with monopolistic competition ￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz because
￿rms￿output are imperfect substitutes. However, in the class of dynamic general equilibrium models
we study, strategic complementarities are necessary but not su¢ cient for multiple equilibria. This
4"News shocks" in this literature mean signals received today about future fundamental shocks. Since the antic-
ipated future shocks may not realize and the signals may be incorrect or noisy, this literature is a departure from
rationality and complete information.
5See Schmitt-Grohe (2000) for criticisms of sunspot models.
6In the original Cass-Shell paper, sunspot equilibria are not based on randomizations over fundamental equilibria
and sunspots can be serially correlated. Hence the existence of multiple fundamental equilibria is not a necessary
condition for the existence of sunspots equilibria. In contrast, sunspots equilibria in the recent indeterminacy literature
are based on randomizations over fundamental equilibria. Moreover, when sunspots are associated with the forecast
errors of the model because of local indeterminacy, they cannot be serially correlated.
7For the early literature that links imperfect competition and imperfect information to sunspots equilibria, see
Ng (1980, 1992), Chatterjee and Cooper (1989), Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar (1993), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1998a,1998b), Gali (1994), Peck and Shell (1991), and Woodford (1991), among others. For the more recent literature
along this line of research, see Jaimovich (2007), Dos Santas Ferreira and Dufourt (2006), and Wang and Wen (2008).
3is why the possibility of sunspot equilibria in this class of models has gone unnoticed despite of the
popularity of the Dixit-Stiglitz model in the literature.8;9.
Our ￿ndings are important to the literature because DSGE models with monopolistic compe-
tition ￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz are the workhorse of theoretical and applied macroeconomics in the study
of business cycles and monetary policy. The fast growing New Keynesian sticky-price literature is
just one of the many noticeable areas that rely on this framework for business-cycle studies and
monetary policy analyses. Yet this literature has been assuming unique equilibrium all the way
along, while in fact there may be multiple equilibria in such models. In addition, since the mode
of Kydland and Prescott (1982) can be cast as a limiting case of the Dixit-Stiglitz imperfect com-
petition model, and since ￿ uctuations driven by technology shocks look similar to those driven by
sunspot shocks in this class of models (see the analysis in Section 3 below), the implications of our
￿ndings are broader than what we can cover in this paper.
This paper also provides an alternative approach to modeling autonomous movements in the
marginal cost (or markup) as a source of the business cycle, which complements the approach of Dos
Santas and Dufourt (2006), Jaimovich (2007), and Wang and Wen (2008). These papers consider
￿rms￿entry and exit under imperfect competition as a mechanism to generate multiple fundamental
equilibria or steady states. Sunspot equilibria in these papers are all based on randomizations over
multiple fundamental equilibria. In contrast, sunspot equilibria considered in this paper do not
rely on randomizations over fundamental equilibria, exemplifying the original insight of Cass and
Shell (1983).10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a simple benchmark general
equilibrium model of imperfect competition and shows the possibility of stochastic sunspot-Nash
equilibria under incomplete information. Section 3 extends the model to a more general setting
8An important exception is Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998a,1998b), who show that a combination of sticky prices and
monetary policy can lead to global indeterminacy of the marginal cost under imperfect competition ￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz.
In particular, they showed that ￿rms￿marginal costs can be indeterminate in a monetary model with one-period sticky
prices if monetary policy can induce zero interest rate so that the cash-in-advance constraint is slack. However, as we
will discuss in more details in this paper, the fundamental factor that causes the marginal cost to be indeterminate
is neither sticky prices nor monetary policy, but incomplete information. When ￿rms must set prices one period
in advance, their information regarding the next period￿ s aggregate demand is bound to be incomplete. It is this
incompleteness in information that can generate self-ful￿lling expectations. Therefore, we are able to show that self-
ful￿lling sunspot equilibria can also exist in standard monetary models even if prices are perfectly ￿ exible (regardless
of monetary policy).
9Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) are able to construct multiple fundamental equilibria in a model similar to ours
under the additional assumption of menu costs. Kiyotaki (1988) uses a similar set up to generate multiple fundamental
equilibria under the additional assumption of increasing returns to scale. Chatterjee and Cooper (1989) prove the
existence of multiple fundamental Nash equilibria in similar models under the additional assumption of participation
externalities. An important distinction between this literature and our paper is that we do not need to change
the physical structure of the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model except relaxing the assumption of complete information.
The type of sunspot equilibria we construct are not based on randomizations over fundamental equilibria and they
continue to exist in the extended models of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Kiyotaki (1988), Benhabib and Farmer
(1994), Chatterjee and Cooper (1989), and many others.
10In another related paper, Wang and Wen (2006) use the same mechanism of this current paper to study the
welfare implications of sunspot-driven ￿ uctuations in an endogenous growth model. Wang and Wen (2006) show that
the average growth rate and the volatility of output can be negatively related because of sunspots, which is consistent
with the empirical evidence found by Ramey and Ramey (1995).
4of the information structure and further illustrates the nature of sunspot equilibria based on in-
complete information. Serially correlated sunspots are constructed and calibrated business-cycle
studies are conducted. Section 4 extends the analysis to monetary models with and without sticky
prices. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Benchmark Model
Suppose there is a continuum of intermediate good producers indexed by i ￿[0;1]; with each pro-
ducing a single di⁄erentiated good Y (i). The price of Y (i) is denoted P(i). These intermediate














where ￿ > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution among the intermediate goods. The ￿nal good
industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive. The price of the ￿nal good, P, is normalized to
one. Pro￿t maximization by the ￿nal good producer yields the demand function for intermediate
goods:
Y (i) = P(i)￿￿Y: (2)
Notice that the demand for good i depends not only on the relative price of the good, but also
on aggregate demand Y . There are thus demand externalities in the model as pointed out by
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). The demand externalities arise endogenously within the model due
to the complementarity of production factors (intermediate goods) in the ￿nal good industry, as
opposed to being exogenously imposed from outside as in the Benhabib-Farmer model. Substituting






For simplicity, the production technology for intermediate goods is given by
Y (i) = N(i): (3)
Intermediate good producers have monopoly power in the output market but are perfectly com-
petitive in the factor markets. Given the production technology, the cost function of an inter-
mediate good ￿rm can be derived by solving a cost-minimization problem, minWN(i) subject to
N(i) ￿ Y (i), where W denotes the real wage. Letting ￿(i) denote the marginal cost of ￿rm i
(which is the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint of the ￿rm￿ s cost minimization problem), we
5have ￿(i) = W as the unit cost function of the ￿rm. Thus marginal cost is the same across all
￿rms. Since ￿ is the shadow cost of increasing ￿rm i￿ s output by one unit, in general equilibrium
its correlation with aggregate demand is nonnegative: cov(￿;Y ) ￿ 0.
Suppose we close the model by having a representative household maximizing the utility func-
tion, u(C;N) = logC ￿ N, subject to the budget constraint, C ￿ WN + ￿, where C denotes
aggregate consumption, N aggregate labor supply, and ￿ aggregate pro￿t income. The ￿rst-order
condition for labor supply gives C = W = ￿. In general equilibrium, C = Y ; hence, the marginal
cost is a function of aggregate demand, ￿(Yt) = Yt. Also, the marginal utility of consumption is
given by !
Y .
A key feature of the model is that intermediate-goods ￿rms set prices simultaneously while tak-
ing as given the anticipated aggregate marginal cost and prices set by other ￿rms, with equilibrium
quantities (including the aggregate marginal cost itself) being then determined at these prices.
This price-setting game permits self-ful￿lling expectations because intermediate-goods ￿rms must
decide pro￿t-maximizing prices without knowing the consequent equilibrium aggregate demand and
the marginal cost that may prevail in the market. Yet these aggregate economic variables depend
crucially on the actions of the other ￿rms over which an individual ￿rm has no in￿ uence.
The possibility of multiple sunspot-Nash equilibrium in this class of models has gone largely
unnoticed by the existing literature because this literature implicitly assumes that ￿rms are able
to perfectly anticipate the equilibrium marginal cost (￿) and aggregate demand (Y ) when setting
prices. If the marginal cost is known, then the level of aggregate demand is known and ￿rms can set
price accordingly as a markup over the marginal cost, ￿(Y ). In a symmetric equilibrium, P(i) = 1;
hence, the equilibrium output (Y ) is then fully and uniquely determined in general equilibrium,
and each ￿rm￿ s output level is also determined according to (2). However, there are no a priori
grounds to guarantee that all ￿rms can perfectly anticipate the equilibrium outcomes of the market,
as emphasized by Keynes (1936). If each ￿rm must form expectations on the equilibrium outcome,
or try to forecast the forecast of others, multiple sunspot-Nash equilibria are possible.
De￿ne ~ ￿t as the information set available to price setting ￿rms in period t; which includes the
entire history of the economy up to period t except the realizations of sunspots (if any) in period
t. Denote ￿t as the information set that includes ~ ￿t and any realization of sunspots in period t.
Thus we have ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1.11 Based on this de￿nition of information sets, each individual ￿rm
i chooses price Pt(i) in each period t to maximize expected pro￿ts by solving12
11Notice that our de￿nition of information sets does not imply sticky prices. Prices respond immediately to any
fundamental shocks in the model. That is, the information set ~ ￿t can include fundamental shocks realized in period
t. As such, prices can respond to money shocks one for one.
12The reason that an individual ￿rm needs to form expectations when maximizing pro￿ts is because the pro￿ts
depend on aggregate demand, which is unknown to the ￿rm because it depends on other ￿rms￿actions. The marginal





[(Pt(i) ￿ ￿t)Yt(i)]j~ ￿t
￿
; (4)
subject to the downward sloping demand function (2); where ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is discounted by the
marginal utility of the household, 1
C.13 Notice that (2) is also the best correspondence of ￿rm i￿ s
action given the other ￿rms￿actions.










￿￿1 ￿ 1. In the limiting case where ￿ ! 1, the model converges to a perfectly competitive
economy. Our analysis of sunspot equilibria is independent of ￿, hence it applies equally to perfectly
(or near-perfectly) competitive economies where ￿rms set prices equal to marginal cost with zero
markup in the steady-state. The optimal pricing rule (5) shows that an individual ￿rm sets prices
according to the expected marginal cost that may prevail in the factor market, which in turn




E￿ = 1: (6)
Suppose there is no extrinsic uncertainty (i.e., there is perfect information about the marginal
cost or the level of aggregate demand); then Equation (6) implies ￿
￿￿1￿t = 1. Hence, a constant
marginal cost, ￿ = ￿￿1
￿ ; is the only fundamental-equilibrium solution to Equation (6). Given ￿,
aggregate demand is then fully determined at the level Y = ￿￿1
￿ . Equation (2) then indicates that
all ￿rms produce Y (i) = ￿￿1
￿ .
However, with extrinsic uncertainty or imperfect information, a random process ￿t may also





where "t denotes sunspots. Any random process f￿tg satisfying E" = 1 may constitute an equilib-
rium in which the level of aggregate demand is given by Yt = ￿t.
The intuition is illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose ￿rms have full information about the marginal
cost ￿(Y ) when setting prices, then the optimal monopoly price is set to P(i) = ￿
￿￿1￿(Y ). Hence,
13Whether or not to discount ￿rm￿ s pro￿t by household￿ s marginal utility does not a⁄ect the existence of sunspots.













Since ￿ > 1, this best correspondence is shown in Figure 1 as a downward sloping curve intersecting
the 45 degree line at the point Y ￿. Since P(i) = 1 in a symmetric equilibrium, we must have ￿ = ￿￿1
￿
and Y (i) = Y ￿ = ￿￿1
￿ , which is the unique certainty equilibrium under full information. Notice
that, even though equation (2) implies Y (i) = Y , there are no other equilibria along the 45 degree
line except Y ￿. This is so because prices are set according to aggregate demand.
Figure 1. Sunspot Equilibrium.
However, suppose prices are exogenously ￿xed at P(i) = 1 by, say, the government.14 Then the
best correspondence (2) becomes
Y (i) = Y; (9)
which is the 45 degree line in Figure 1. In such a case, the equilibrium output is completely
indeterminate, and the model has in￿nite certainty Nash equilibria along the 45 degree line as long
as ￿(Y ) ￿ 1 so that production is pro￿table. That is, any point along the 45 degree line below
Y ￿ 1 is a possible equilibrium and the equilibria are Pareto ranked. This case is similar to that
analyzed by Copper and John (1988) and it arises because there is nothing to pin down the marginal
cost and the demand externalities create a strategic complementarity among ￿rms￿actions.
14Government can also ￿x the prices at other values and the arguments are the same, but the discussions are
slightly more involved because this involves the pro￿ts of the ￿nal-good sector.
8Now, suppose we let ￿rms endogenously set their prices optimally according to equation (5).
Then in a symmetric equilibrium we still have P(i) = 1 and the ￿rm￿ s best correspondence is still
given by (9). In this case, the only certainty equilibrium is given by Y (i) = Y ￿ and there do not
exist other certainty equilibria along the 45 degree line. To see this, suppose all ￿rms expect the
aggregate marginal cost to be lower than ￿￿1
￿ so that the aggregate demand is at Y = Y ￿ ￿ ",
where " is a positive number. Firms would then set prices low accordingly so that P(i) < 1. At
the low price level we have the best correspondence Y (i) = P(i)￿￿ [Y ￿ ￿ "] > Y ￿ ￿ " for all i.
This implies Y > Y ￿ ￿ " in a symmetric equilibrium, which is a contradiction. Hence, a constant
output level Y < Y ￿ cannot be an equilibrium. Similarly, any constant output level Y > Y ￿ does
not constitute an equilibrium either. This explains why the model economy has a unique certainty
equilibrium given by Y ￿ even with imperfect information. However, with imperfect information,
there also exist stochastic equilibria that are not mere randomizations over fundamental equilibria.
For example, when setting prices, if ￿rms expect the aggregate marginal cost to be high with
probability ￿ > 0 and low with probability 1 ￿ ￿ > 0 such that the implied average marginal cost
satis￿es the constraint (6); then such an expectation constitutes a self-ful￿lling stochastic sunspot
equilibrium. In a sunspot equilibrium, the level of aggregate output moves stochastically along
the 45 degree line around Y ￿. The variance of the stochastic path in this benchmark model is not
restricted by the model￿ s structural parameters except by feasibility conditions (e.g., Y 2 (0;1)).
Therefore, a sunspot equilibrium, if it exists, must be stochastic in nature. The source of sunspot
equilibria comes from the fact that ￿rms do not know how the other ￿rms will behave when setting
prices, and hence must form expectations for the status of the aggregate economy (e.g., the marginal
cost or the level of aggregate demand). Due to the endogenous demand externalities among ￿rms￿
actions, such expectations can be self-ful￿lling. Prices in a sunspot equilibrium appear to be
"sticky" in the sense that they cannot be adjusted after sunspots are realized. However, since
prices can be set after observing fundamental shocks such as monetary shocks, they are not sticky
in the conventional sense because they can respond proportionately to aggregate money supply
shocks. Figure 2 illustrates the time line of events in a sunspot equilibrium.15
15In any game where ￿rms must choose prices simultaneously instead of quantities, the optimal prices can be chosen
based on expected equilibrium outcomes that may prevail as soon as all parties have set their prices. Does this imply
￿ sticky" prices? We do not think so. It is only a metaphor when we say that sunspots are realized after prices
are set but before quantities are determined. In fact, all events can take place simultaneously in the price setting
game. See the next section for more discussions on this issue using Lucas￿(1972) island model in which prices can
respond to sunspots. In addition, one may argue that sunspots do not matter if they are realized before ￿rms can
set prices. True, but this is not the point. "Sunspots" by its conventional de￿nition of Cass and Shell (1983) can
exist anywhere at anytime. Economic agents cannot control where and when sunspots appear. The only important
question is whether they matter or not to the economy. Here we show that they do matter.
9) (i pt
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Figure 2. Timing of Sunspots.
3 A More General Approach
To further illustrate that the key condition for sunspot equilibria is not exactly sticky prices per
se but speculations based on incomplete information, this section uses an alternative information
structure to prove the existence of sunspot equilibrium. This information structure is akin to Lucas￿
(1972) island economy, is more general, and includes the previous analysis as a special case. We also
add capital accumulation into the model to study the robustness and business cycle implications
of sunspots.
Suppose ￿rms reside in di⁄erent islands with only limited information about the aggregate
economy. They can be informed about the level of aggregate demand and marginal cost through
signals when setting prices. Since signals contain idiosyncratic noises, information about aggregate
demand and marginal cost is not perfect.
Let the production technology for intermediate goods be given by
Y (i) = A(i)K(i)￿N(i)1￿￿; (10)
where A(i) represents idiosyncratic shocks to ￿rm i￿ s productivity (or marginal cost) and K(i)
represents the capital stock. Letting ￿(i) denote the marginal cost of ￿rm i, the factor demand
functions for labor and capital are then given by W = (1 ￿ ￿)￿(i)
Y (i)
N(i) and R = ￿￿(i)
Y (i)
K(i), re-








as the unit cost function of ￿rm i. Thus,












A(i)di = 1, the aggregate component
equals the aggregate marginal cost, ￿ =
R 1
0 ￿(i)di.
Firms set prices in each period based on imperfect signals of aggregate demand. De￿ne si
t as
the signal received by ￿rm i, ￿i
t as the information set of ￿rm i, which includes the entire history
of the economy up to the point when si
t is received. That is, the information set includes si
t.
Such an information structure is standard in the incomplete information literature (see, e.g., Lucas
1972; Kasa 1996, Lorenzoni 2006, and Rondina 2007, among others). Based on this de￿nition of















Y ; where ￿t denotes the mar-





denotes ￿rm i￿ s expectations conditioned on the information
set ￿i



















di = 1: (13)
Equation (13) determines the equilibrium aggregate marginal cost ￿t.
As in the previous section, the current model has a unique certainty equilibrium featuring
￿ = ￿￿1
￿ . To illustrate the possibility of multiple Nash sunspot equilibria, log-linearizing equation
(12) around the unique steady state16 and using circum￿ ex to denote log-linearized variables gives
us
^ Pt(i) = Ei^ ￿t(i) = E
n




Suppose the signal received by ￿rm i in period t is a (log)linear combination of aggregate demand
(measured by the aggregate marginal cost ￿t) and a noise term (measured by its own productivity
shock At(i)),
si
t = ￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ At(i); (15)
16The steady state of individual ￿rm￿ s variables can be de￿ned as the corresponding average value across ￿rms.
Such a de￿nition has no ￿rst-order e⁄ects on our results.
11where ￿ 2 [0;1] and ^ At is i:i:d: Under the assumption of i:i:d: shocks, only the most recent signal
is useful in forecasting ￿i










￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
A
￿2￿2
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
A
￿h
￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ At(i)
i
: (16)
Since the aggregate price is normalized to one (equation 13), we have
R ^ P(i)di = 0. Hence, inte-
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and (iii) ￿ = 0. Each case corresponds to a particular equilibrium path of the marginal cost.
First, if ^ ￿t = 0, then ￿ is a constant; hence, ￿t(i) is orthogonal to the aggregate variables ￿t
and Yt. Equation (12) implies p(i) = ￿
￿￿1￿(i).17 Integration implies ￿ = ￿￿1
￿ . Thus, we obtain
the fundamental (certainty) equilibrium. Therefore, regardless whether information is incomplete
or not, a constant marginal cost (^ ￿ = 0) is always an equilibrium and it is the only certainty
equilibrium.
However, notice that the certainty equilibrium can also be obtained under the assumption of
complete information. Namely, suppose ￿ = 1; then, in order for Equation (17) to hold, the
equilibrium marginal cost must be a constant (^ ￿t = 0), which is why the existing literature obtains
a unique fundamental equilibrium under the implicit assumption of perfect information.
Second, if ￿ < 1 (incomplete information), we are able to construct sunspot equilibria where











￿ constitutes a sunspot equilibrium. Therefore, with incomplete information, there can
exist multiple sunspot equilibria and such equilibria are not mere randomizations over fundamental
equilibria.
Finally, in the special case where ￿ = 0, the signal si
t provides no information about period
t aggregate demand. Hence, the aggregate marginal cost is completely indeterminate because it
is impossible for ￿rms to forecast it. With log linearization, the variance of the marginal cost
is completely unrestricted. This is identical to the sunspot equilibrium analyzed in the previous
section of this paper.
17With ￿ being constant, ￿rm i is able to perfectly forecast ￿(i): Ef￿(i)j￿
ig = ￿(i).
12The intuition for the existence of sunspot equilibria with imperfect signals (0 < ￿ < 1) is as
follows. Sunspot equilibrium, by de￿nition, implies coordinated behaviors based on common beliefs
among agents. If individuals are largely a⁄ected by their own idiosyncratic shocks, then such a
coordinated action becomes harder. Hence, sunspot equilibria in our model involves the condition
under which all ￿rms behave similarly regardless of their idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, Equations
(16) and (17) imply that this condition for the rise of sunspot equilibrium is such that the least-









= 0. This implies that all ￿rms set the same
prices (see 14) and produce the same quantities along a sunspot equilibrium path regardless of their
idiosyncratic shocks Ai. In other words, in a sunspot equilibrium, individual signals do not matter





A, which restricts the standard deviation of a stochastic Nash equilibrium path
of aggregate demand along the 45 degree line in Figure 1. This variance restriction requires that
the variability of sunspots be proportional to that of idiosyncratic noise and the proportionality be
a decreasing function of the precision (￿) of the signal. For example, if the variance of the noise is
zero, then a sunspot equilibrium must involve a constant path of the aggregate demand. On the
other hand, if ￿2
A is large, then in order to achieve coordination as well as pro￿t maximization, a
sunspot equilibrium must involve a large variance of ￿. On the other hand, given ￿2
A, the more
information there is in the signal (i.e., a larger ￿), the less variable is the sunspot equilibrium path
along the 45 degree line.
It is also possible to obtain serially correlated sunspots in this model. For example, assume that
each ￿rm￿ s idiosyncratic cost shock is a serially correlated stationary AR(1) process in log,
^ At(i) = ￿ ^ At￿1(i) + "i
t; (18)
where " is i:i:d: with variance ￿2
"; and that each ￿rm￿ s information set contains the entire history
of the signal si






Such a setup of ￿rm￿ s information set has also been used by Woodford (2003). We can show that
there exists correlated sunspot equilibria such that
^ ￿t = ￿^ ￿t￿1 + ￿t; (20)







13In other words, sunspots follows the same AR(1) process as the idiosyncratic productivity shocks.




[^ ￿t ￿ ^ At(i)]j[￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ At(i);￿^ ￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ At￿1(i);:::]
o
: (22)
Notice that because both ￿t and At(i) follows the same process by conjecture, we can write
si
t = ￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ At(i) =
1 X
j=0
￿j(￿￿t￿j + (1 ￿ ￿)"i
t￿j): (23)
The information set ￿i
t is then equivalent to ~ ￿i
t = f￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)"i
t;￿￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)"i
t￿1;:::g. So ^ Pi
t
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such that equations (20) and (21) are satis￿ed.
Business Cycle Implications. Sunspots under incomplete information have important im-
plications for understanding the business cycle. To see this, we close the model by having a
representative household with period-utility function, u(C;N) = logC ￿ an
N1+￿
1+￿ , and the budget
constraint,
Ct + Kt+1 = WtNt + (1 + Rt ￿ ￿)Kt + ￿t; (26)
where Kt is the household￿ s existing stock of capital, which depreciates at the rate ￿ 2 (0;1]; WtNt
and RtKt are the household￿ s wage income and rental income, respectively; and ￿ is the aggregate
pro￿t income from ￿rms.
14Denote a circum￿ ex variable as ^ Xt(i) ￿ logXt(i)￿log ￿ X, where ￿ X denotes the long-run average
value of X(i) in a deterministic steady state. Log-linearizing equation (13) and the ￿rst-order
conditions of the ￿rms and the household around the deterministic steady state give the following





[^ ￿t ￿ ^ At(i)]jsi
t
o
di = 0 (27)
(￿ + ￿) ^ Nt = ^ ￿t + ￿ ^ Kt ￿ ^ Ct (28)
^ Ct = Et ^ Ct+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))Et
h
^ ￿t+1 + (￿ ￿ 1) ^ Kt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Nt+1
i
(29)









= ￿ ^ Kt + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Nt; (30)
where s = ￿
￿￿￿ ￿
1￿￿(1￿￿) is the steady-state saving rate.
Notice that equation (27) determines the aggregate marginal cost ^ ￿t. Once the time path of the
marginal cost is given, the model is identical to a standard RBC model with an exogenous forcing




t, and the signal received by ￿rms in each period t be a mixture of an aggregate component
and an idiosyncratic component, ￿^ ￿t +(1￿￿) ^ Ai
t. In such a case, as shown previously, a stochastic















+ ￿^ ￿t: (31)
The saddle-path property of the model implies that the coe¢ cient matrix M has exactly one




can be solved by the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980). The solution takes the form, ^ Ct =
￿k ^ Kt+￿￿^ ￿t; where the coe¢ cients f￿k;￿￿g are functions of the structural parameters of the model.
Following the existing RBC literature (e.g., King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 1988), we calibrate the
model as follows: the time period is a quarter, the time discounting factor ￿ = 0:99, the rate of
depreciation ￿ = 0:025, the inverse labor supply elasticity ￿ = 0:25, and capital￿ s share in aggregate
output ￿ = 0:4. We set the elasticity parameter ￿ = 10 (implying a 10% markup for intermediat-




15Figure 3. Impulse Responses to a Sunspot Shock.
The impulse responses of the benchmark model to a sunspot shock to the marginal cost (or
aggregate demand) are graphed in Figure 3. Notice that a positive one-standard-deviation shock
to the marginal cost generates positive responses from employment, output, and investment. Con-
sumption is initially negative but soon turns to positive in the subsequent periods.18 Investment is
far more volatile than output because of the incentive for consumption smoothing. Thus the model
is able to explain the stylized business cycle facts emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1982): the
positive comovements among key aggregate variables; the typical volatility orders among consump-
tion, output, and investment; and the persistence of these variables. These business cycle facts are
commonly thought to be explainable only by technology shocks. Here we show that they are also
explainable by sunspot-driven aggregate demand shocks.
The predicted second moments of the model under AR(1) sunspot shocks and AR(1) aggregate
technology shocks with the same persistence are summarized in Table 1. It shows that the model is
able to explain the salient features of the business cycle as well as a standard RBC model driven by
aggregate technology shocks and that the business-cycle e⁄ects of sunspot shocks and technology
shocks are very similar.19 One important exception is hours worked: the volatility of hours worked
relative to output is too small under technology shocks but too large under sunspots shocks.20 The
reason is that sunspots shocks do not a⁄ect aggregate productivity while technology shocks do. The
18The initial consumption is positive if the shocks are less serially correlated.
19Notice that our model is identical to a standard RBC model without sunspot shocks. Hence, its dynamics under
technology shocks are identical to those of a standard RBC model.
20In the U.S. data, hours worked are about as volatile as output.
16intuition for the similarity between sunspot-driven business cycle and technology-driven business
cycle is that the marginal cost measures the increase in production cost when ￿rms￿output demand
increases by one unit. As such, sunspots shocks to the marginal cost re￿ ect shocks to expected
demand. Because of strategic complementarity under the demand externalities, such demand-side
shocks are e⁄ectively the same as shocks to ￿rms￿marginal revenue or production e¢ ciency. Thus,
they look like productivity shocks except that they do not change aggregate productivity.
Table 1. Predicted Second Moments￿
Volatility (￿x
￿y) Correlation with y Autocorrelation
c i n c i n y c i n
Sunspots 0:57 2:88 1:32 0:61 0:92 0:93 0:93 0:99 0:88 0:88
Technology 0:61 2:48 0:51 0:79 0:93 0:81 0:92 0:99 0:88 0:86
￿In the table, y denotes output, c consumption, i investment, and n labor.
Discussion. If variable capital utilization rate is allowed in the model as in Greenwood et al.
(1988), then shocks to the marginal cost also increase the total factor productivity through their
impact on capacity utilization. Hence, the problem of excess volatility of hours relative to output
under sunspot shocks can be mitigated. An important implication of sunspots equilibria is that
the markup is countercyclical, which is in line with the empirical evidence.21 In the model, the
markup is given by the inverse of the marginal cost, 1
￿. When expected demand is high, ￿rms opt
to produce more, and the marginal cost increases, leading to a lower markup. This implication of
counter-cyclical markup is in sharp contrast to cases with fundamental shocks. Under fundamental
shocks only (i.e., without extrinsic uncertainty), the markup is always constant in the model. More
importantly, notice that counter-cyclical markup is obtained regardless of the monopoly power,
since the same results hold even as ￿ ! 1. In this case, although the markup is zero in the steady
state, it ￿ uctuates under sunspots shocks. Thus, even though the markets are perfectly (or near-
perfectly) competitive and ￿rms set prices equal to expected marginal cost, because the expected
marginal cost comoves with expected aggregate demand, the markup can be countercyclical during
the business cycle, regardless of the degree of imperfect competition.
4 Money and Sticky Prices
Our previous analyses about incomplete information as a new source of sunspots are conducted in
real models where ￿rms set real prices. One may argue that in a monetary model (e.g., a model
with the cash-in-advance constraint always binding), if nominal prices are sticky, then sunspots do
not matter because the CIA constraint pins down the level of aggregate demand given the money
21The stylized fact of countercyclical markup has been documented extensively in the empirical literature. See,
e.g., Bils (1987), Rotemberg and Woodford (1991,1999), Martins, Scapetta, and Pilat (1996).
17supply and the sticky price level. This section shows that such a conclusion is not true in general
and our previous analyses carry over to a variety of standard monetary models with and without
sticky prices. That is, under a more general speci￿cation of incomplete information, there can still
exist sunspot equilibria as long as there is a positive measure of ￿rms who can adjust prices in each
period.22 To simplify the analysis, we abstract capital from the models (implying the technology
Y (i) = Ai
tNt(i)) and set the household problem identical to that in the benchmark model.
4.1 Exogenous Money Supply
Let money be exogenously supplied and the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint strictly bind. Denote
P as the aggregate nominal price level and P(i) the nominal price charged by ￿rm i. The optimal
































Using lower-case circum￿ ex to denote percentage deviations from the steady state, log-linearizing
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Notice that the model involves a form of "forecasting the forecast of others" discussed by Townsend
(1983).
Since the real wage equals the marginal cost, the household￿ s optimization leads to a relationship
between aggregate income and the real marginal cost around the steady state:
^ Yt = ￿^ ￿t; (36)
22Since the focus of our paper is not about monetary policies as a source of indeterminacy, in this section we
consider only the standard monetary models with standard monetary policies.
18where ￿ > 0 is a function of structural parameters (e.g., from the utility functions). The system
of equations that determine the general equilibrium of the model are given by equations (34)-(36)
plus the CIA constraint,
^ Pt + ^ Yt = 0: (37)
So we have essentially three equations with three unknowns, f^ Yt; ^ ￿t; ^ Ptg.
Notice that, under perfect information, equation (34) becomes ^ Pi
t = ^ ￿t ￿ ^ Ai
t + ^ Pt, so by inte-
grating equation (35) we get ^ ￿t = 0. Therefore, under perfect information, ^ ￿t = ^ Yt = ^ Pt = 0 is the
only equilibrium. So, sunspots do not matter. However, suppose the information set of ￿rm i is
given by equation (15), where the idiosyncratic productivity shocks are i:i:d. The CIA constraint
(37) and the relationship (36) implies
^ Pt = ￿￿^ ￿t: (38)





￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
A
￿2￿2
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
A
￿h








￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
A
￿2￿2




Thus, the system of equations determining the general equilibrium of the model is given by equations
(37), (38), and (40), with three unknowns f^ Y ; ^ ￿; ^ Pg. In order for this system to be indeterminate,
the rank of the system has to be less than 3. This suggests that (40) and (38) must be colinear, or
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿2
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A
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￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
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￿
￿ = ￿￿: (41)














which is positive if




This is the condition of sunspot equilibria in a monetary model with ￿ exible prices and the CIA
constraint always binding. Although the variance of sunspot shocks depends on the model￿ s struc-
19tural parameters (such as ￿A and ￿), sunspots always exist for any ￿nite value of ￿ as long as the
information precision parameter ￿ satis￿es (43).
Notice that if ￿ = 0, then sunspots do not matter. In this case, the system has full rank and the
unique solution of the system is ^ ￿t = ^ Yt = ^ Pt = 0. This case is identical to a sticky nominal price
model where prices are set one period in advance without any information about the equilibrium
aggregate demand that may prevail in the economy.23
The intuition behind the sunspot condition (41) is similar to that in the real model, except here
individual ￿rms￿prices and quantities are no longer the same across ￿rms in a sunspot equilibrium.
To see this, substituting (41) into (39) gives
^ Pi









which indicates that individual ￿rms￿prices di⁄er across ￿rms by the idiosyncratic marginal cost
term, ￿￿
(1￿￿)
￿ ^ Ai, but share the same systematic component ^ P (the aggregate price). Why in a
monetary model must ￿rms set di⁄erent prices along a sunspot path whereas they must choose the
same prices in non-monetary models? The answer: With money and the CIA constraint binding,
a sunspot equilibrium requires that aggregate price be a⁄ected by sunspots (i.e., not perfectly
observable). If ￿rms all set the same prices, the aggregate price is then known to the ￿rms. In such
a case, sunspots do not matter. However, despite ￿rms setting di⁄erent prices, these prices must
be equal the aggregate price on average in a sunspot equilibrium according to (44). Because ￿rms￿
prices must be in￿ uences by idiosyncratic noise, coordination is more di¢ cult in a monetary model.
This is why the variance of sunspots is more restrictive than that in a real model (see 43) in the




To study the e⁄ects of endogenous monetary policy on the possibility of sunspots, consider the
Taylor rule,
^ rt = !￿^ ￿t + !y ^ Yt; (45)
where r denotes the nominal interest rate and ￿ the in￿ ation rate in period t. Assume !￿ > 1 so
as to ensure that the Taylor rule itself does not cause indeterminacy. With endogenous monetary
23But, if the CIA constraint is slack, then there is indeterminacy in P, implying that ￿ and Y are also indeterminate.






always exist whether the CIA constraint binds or not.
20policy, the additional new equation is the household￿ s Euler equation for nominal bond holding,
￿^ Yt + ^ rt = ￿Et^ Yt+1 + Et^ ￿t+1; (46)
where ￿ is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income. The rest of the equations are the same
as (34), (35), (36), and (37).
For simplicity, we focus on i:i:d: sunspots only. Hence, Et^ ￿t+1 = Et^ ￿t+1 = 0. Substituting out




￿~ ￿^ ￿t: Because ^ Pt￿1 is a function of ^ ￿t￿1 and is known at t, we can subtract ^ Pt￿1 from both sides
of equation (34) to obtain
^ Pi
t ￿ ^ Pt￿1 = Ei
￿
^ ￿t ￿ ^ Ai




t ￿ ^ Pi




^ ￿t ￿ ^ Ai
t + ^ ￿t
￿
: (48)
Notice that ^ ￿t =
R 1
0 ^ ￿i
tdi. Substituting out the aggregate in￿ ation rate using ^ ￿t = ￿~ ￿^ ￿t in equation
(48), our previous discussions following equations (34)-(40) show that if 1 > ￿ > ￿
1+￿; there exist
sunspot equilibria. Hence, the existence of sunspots dose not depend on the form of monetary
policy.
4.3 Sticky Prices
Although we believe our result holds in the more general Calvo-type (1983) sticky price models, to
simplify our analysis, we consider only one-period sticky prices in this paper. Suppose there are two
type of ￿rms in the economy, with ￿ fraction of ￿rms set nominal prices (P1) one period in advance,
and 1 ￿ ￿ fraction of ￿rms set prices (P2) each period based on the signals st as discussed in the
previous cases. For ￿rms who set prices one period in advance (type 1 ￿rm), the pro￿t-maximizing































21The log-linearized prices are given, respectively, by
^ P1
t (i) = Et￿1[ ^ Pt + ^ ￿t ￿ ^ At(i)]; (51)
^ P2
t (i) = E[ ^ Pt + ^ ￿t ￿ ^ At(i)]jsi
t: (52)
The log-linearized aggregate price index is given by









and the CIA constraint implies
￿^ ￿t + ^ Pt = ^ mt; (54)
where ^ mt = 0 is total money supply. To see the possibility of sunspots in this setup, assume the
idiosyncratic shock Ai is i:i:d:, and we can conjecture a sunspot equilibrium in which the aggregate
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The aggregate price level then becomes
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A positive variance requires






That is, the fraction of ￿ exible-price ￿rms must be large enough. Clearly sunspot equilibria are
more di¢ cult to arise in sticky-price models. For example, if all ￿rms set prices one period in
advance (￿ = 1), the above condition cannot be satis￿ed and sunspots do not matter.
22Now suppose that the money supply is stochastic so that ^ mt 6= 0. Since there are one-period
sticky prices, monetary e⁄ects can only have at most a one-period real e⁄ect on the real economy.
Without loss of generality, we can focus on i:i:d monetary shocks. With ^ mt 6= 0, the two types of
￿rms￿monopoly prices become
^ P1
t (i) = Et￿1[(1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿t + ^ mt ￿ ^ At(i)] = 0; (60)
^ P2
t (i) = E
n
[(1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿t ￿ ^ At(i) + ^ mt]j[￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ At(i); ^ mt]
o
; (61)
respectively. There is always a solution for the marginal cost such that ^ ￿t = ￿
1￿￿+￿￿ ^ mt and hence
^ Pt = 1￿￿
1￿￿+￿￿ ^ mt. This is the fundamental equilibrium with aggregate monetary shocks. But there
also exist sunspot equilibria satisfying
^ ￿t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
^ mt + ^ "t; ^ Pt =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
^ mt ￿ ￿^ "t; (62)
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where (1 ￿ ￿) > ￿(
1￿￿
￿ ). To prove this, notice that
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It is then straightforward to see that aggregate price satis￿es
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Comparing (65) with (62) gives the results we need.
Stabilizing Monetary Policy. Since money has real e⁄ects under sticky prices, monetary
policies can stabilize the economy driven by sunspots. For example, the central bank can decrease
money stock if ^ "t is high and increase money stock if ^ "t is low. This type of endogenous monetary
policy requires the central bank be able to observe the aggregate demand. Consider the following
counter-cyclical policy,
^ mt = ￿￿^ ￿t; (66)
23where ￿ is a Taylor-rule type parameter. Given this monetary policy function, the CIA constraint
becomes
￿^ ￿t + ^ Pt = ￿￿^ ￿t; (67)
which implies
^ Pt = ￿(￿ + ￿) ^ ￿t; (68)
The condition that gives rise to sunspots discussed before (59) now becomes






Clearly, the central bank can set the policy parameter ￿ to insulate the economy from sunspot-driven
￿ uctuations. For example, if ￿ >
(1￿￿)￿
1￿￿ ￿￿, then (69) is impossible to satisfy, so sunspot equilibria
are completely eliminated. On the other hand, if monetary policies are procyclical (￿ < 0), then
sunspots-driven ￿ uctuations become much easier to arise. This also suggests that government policy
itself can facilitate self-ful￿lling ￿ uctuations when it is accommodative.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that self-ful￿lling rational expectations equilibria can arise in standard Dixit-
Stiglitz DSGE models with monopolistic competition. Even though the fundamental equilibrium is
unique in this class of models, there can exist multiple stochastic sunspot-Nash equilibria that are
not mere randomizations over fundamental equilibria. This type of sunspot equilibria is associated
with extrinsic uncertainty during the process of expectation formation. A key friction for generating
extrinsic uncertainty in our model is that individual ￿rms make price decisions simultaneously
without knowing how the other agents in the economy will behave; thus, they each must face an
aggregate uncertainty regarding other ￿rms￿actions.24 Given the complementarity among agents￿
actions, such extrinsic uncertainty can be self-ful￿lling. By embedding this insight into DSGE
models, our approach provides a new channel to study expectations-driven ￿ uctuations.
Our analyses also show that aggregate ￿ uctuations driven by sunspots are almost indistinguish-
able from those driven by technology shocks because sunspots a⁄ect aggregate demand through the
marginal costs. The welfare implications of such sunspot-driven business cycles is carried out in
Wang and Wen (2006) to study the interactions between sunspots and endogenous growth, where
we show that with extrinsic uncertainty, short-run volatility and long-run growth are negatively
related, con￿rming the empirical ￿ndings of Ramey and Ramey (1995).
24This type of uncertainty is referred to as market uncertainty by Peck and Shell (1991).
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